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Sticky Leverage†
By João Gomes, Urban Jermann, and Lukas Schmid*
We develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the
interplay between nominal long-term corporate debt, inflation, and
real aggregates. We show that unanticipated inflation changes the real
burden of debt and, more significantly, leads to a debt overhang that
distorts future investment and production decisions. For these effects
to be both large and very persistent, it is essential that debt maturity
exceeds one period. We also show that interest rate rules can help
stabilize our economy. (JEL E12, E31, E44, E52, G01, G32, G35)
The onset of the financial crisis in 2008 triggered the most aggressive monetary
policy response in developed countries in at least 30 years. At the same time, financial markets now occupy a much more prominent role in modern macroeconomic
theory. Typical models of financial frictions focus on debt and identify leverage as
both a source of—and an important mechanism of transmission of—economic fluctuations.1 Surprisingly, the fact that debt contracts are almost always denominated
in nominal terms is usually ignored in the literature.2, 3 Yet, nominal debt creates an
obvious link between inflation and the real economy, a potentially important source
of monetary nonneutrality even with fully flexible prices.
The goal of this paper is to develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the interplay between nominal debt, inflation, and real aggregates, and explore
some of its main implications. In our model, as in reality, firms fund themselves by
choosing the appropriate mix of nominal defaultable debt and equity securities to
* Gomes: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104 (e-mail:
gomesj@wharton.upenn.edu); Jermann: Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 3620 Locust Walk,
Philadelphia, PA 19104 and NBER (e-mail: jermann@wharton.upenn.edu); Schmid: Fuqua School of Business,
Duke University, 100 Fuqua Drive, Durham, NC 27708, and CEPR (e-mail: ls111@duke.edu). We thank three anonymous referees, Manuel Amador, Andrew Atkeson, Mark Gertler, Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde, Andre Kurmann,
John Leahy, Michael Roberts, Victor RÍos-Rull, and Nikolai Roussanov for valuable comments, as well as participants at presentations at the Atlanta Fed, Banque de France, Board of Governors, Boston Fed, CEPR Gerzensee,
Chicago Fed, Cleveland Fed, Dallas Fed, Duke, ECB, Econometric Society, Georgetown, Minneapolis Fed, New
York Fed, NYU, Paris School of Economics, Richmond Fed, Rice, St. Louis Fed, NBER Summer Institute, SED,
UCLA, and Wharton School. All errors are our own. The authors declare that they have no relevant or material
financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper
†
Go to http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130952 to visit the article page for additional materials and author
disclosure statement(s).
1
Some examples include Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999); Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004); Jermann and Quadrini (2012); Gourio (2013); and
Gomes and Schmid (2016).
2
Among the very rare exceptions are Dopke and Schneider (2006); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010);
Fernandez-Villaverde (2010); Bhamra, Fisher, and Kuehn (2011); and De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011).
3
At the end of 2012, US nonfinancial businesses alone had nearly $12.5 trillion in outstanding credit market
debt—about 75 percent of GDP (Federal Reserve Board (FRB) 2013). Nearly all of these instruments are in the
form of nominal liabilities, often issued at fixed rates of interest.
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issue in every period. Debt is priced fairly by bondholders, who take into account
default and inflation risk, but is attractive to issue because of the tax deductibility
of interest payments. Macroeconomic quantities are obtained by aggregating across
the optimal decisions of each firm and by ensuring consistency with the consumption, savings, and labor choices of representative households.
We have two main results. First, because debt contracts are written in nominal
terms, unanticipated changes in inflation, regardless of their source, always have
real effects, even if prices and wages are fully flexible. In particular, lower than
expected inflation increases the real value of debt, worsens firms’ balance sheets,
and makes them more likely to default. If defaults and bankruptcies have resource
costs, this immediately and adversely impacts output and consumption.
Second, and, more importantly, when debt is long-lived, low inflation endogenously creates a debt overhang that persists for many periods—even though debt is
freely adjustable in our model. As a result, even surviving firms cut future investment and production plans, as the increased (real) debt lowers the expected rewards
to their equity owners. It is this debt overhang phenomenon—emphasized in empirical studies of financial crises but generally missing from standard models with only
short-term debt—that accounts for most of the effects of changes in inflation on the
economy.4
After establishing the intuition behind these results in a simple setting with flexible prices, we develop these ideas in the context of a new Keynesian model with
sticky prices and a monetary policy rule, linking short-term nominal interest rates
to inflation and output. We show that the model produces quantitatively plausible
movements in the key macroeconomic quantities. Most notably, with flexible prices,
hours are very smooth and investment and consumption tend to respond differently
to nominal shocks. By contrast, the model with sticky prices significantly raises the
volatility of hours worked and produces more realistic responses to nominal shocks.
The friction we emphasize is probably not suited to understand the response of
the economy to all shocks. Nevertheless, we believe an environment with long-term
nominal debt contracts offers a perspective of financially driven recessions that is
absent from standard models that either abstract from financial frictions or allow
only for short-term debt. In particular, our setting offers a slightly different insight
into the ongoing monetary stimulus around the world. Specifically, in our world
standard Taylor rule parameterizations require central banks to try to raise the rate of
inflation in response to a debt overhang episode, induced, for example, by a decline
in wealth.
One important additional novelty of our paper is that we solve for firms’
time-consistent optimal policies for long-term debt when firms can adjust debt
freely every period. We present a numerical approach that allows the analysis of
model dynamics with perturbation techniques, and as such alleviates the curse of
dimensionality of fully nonlinear global methods.5
While the notion that a debt deflation may have significant macroeconomic consequences goes back at least to Fisher (1933), it has not been incorporated into
Recent examples include Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Mian and Sufi (2014).
A similar time consistency issue arises in dynamic public policy problems, as studied, for instance, by Klein,
Krusell, and R
 Íos-Rull (2008).
4
5
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the modern quantitative macroeconomic literature until quite recently. Our work
contributes to this literature by introducing nominal long-term debt in an aggregate
business-cycle model and studying its role as a nominal transmission channel.
Other macroeconomic analyses with long-term debt and default include Miao
and Wang (2010) and Gomes and Schmid (2016). In both cases the debt is real. In
Gomes and Schmid (2016), firms pick their debt at the time of birth and face costly
adjustment thereafter. Their focus is on the role of asset prices to capture firm heterogeneity and forecast business cycles. The setting in Miao and Wang (2010) is
closer to ours but in their model firms act myopically and fail to take into account
that their current leverage choice influences future leverage, and through that, the
current value of debt. As a result their approach is not really suitable to fully understand the effects of debt overhang.
The asset pricing implications of allowing for nominal corporate debt in a model
driven by productivity and inflation shocks is studied by Kang and Pflueger (2015).
Their empirical analysis supports the view that inflation uncertainty raises corporate
default rates and bond risk premiums. Their model assumes constant labor and considers only two-period debt.
Fernandez-Villaverde (2010) considers nominal government debt, and
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010) embed nominal entrepreneurial loans into
a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. However,
both use short-term debt. De Fiore, Teles, and Tristani (2011) examine optimal
monetary policy when firms have nominal debt with default risk. Eggertson and
Krugman (2012) study leverage and debt overhang with short-term debt, but their
focus is on real debt and investment plays no role in the analysis. Neither offers a
quantitative analysis and both rely on s hort-term debt. Occhino and Pescatori (2014,
2015) examine debt overhang with o ne-period debt. Jermann and Yue (2013) study
interest rate swaps in conjunction with short-term nominal debt and default.
Some studies on sovereign default have also considered long-term debt in equilibrium models, in particular, Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012); Aguiar and
Amador (2013); and Hatchondo, Martinez, and Sosa Padilla (2015). In these studies, debt is real and the problem of a sovereign differs along several dimensions
from the problem of a firm in our model. For instance, firms in our model have the
ability to issue equity to reduce debt, while sovereigns do not have that choice.
The importance of debt overhang to corporate investment has been studied in the
corporate finance literature, but usually in static (real) models which focus solely on
optimal firm decisions and where debt overhang arises exogenously. An early example is Myers (1977), and recent dynamic models are provided in Hennessy (2004);
Moyen (2007); and Chen and Manso (2014).
More broadly, our paper also expands on the growing literature on the macroeconomic effects of financial frictions. This includes Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997);
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999); Cooley,
Marimon, and Quadrini (2004); Gertler and Karadi (2011); and Jermann and
Quadrini (2012).
The next section describes the basic model with flexible prices. Section II examines the key mechanism of regarding the real effects of inflation in a general context.
Section III outlines our solution strategy and discusses our quantitative findings
for the simple flexible price model. Section IV studies the properties of full model
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with sticky prices and a monetary policy rule and is followed by a few concluding
remarks in Section V.
I. Model with Flexible Prices

To isolate the key mechanisms associated with the introduction of long-term
nominal debt financing and investment, we first consider a parsimonious model that
abstracts from other frictions. Firms own the productive technology and the capital
stock in this economy. They are operated by equity holders but partially financed
by defaultable debt claims. The firms’ optimal choices are distorted by taxes and
default costs. Households consume the firms’ output and invest any savings in the
securities issued by firms. The government plays a minimal role: it collects taxes on
corporate income and rebates the revenues to the households in lump-sum fashion.
Later we expand this core setting to include other forms of nominal rigidities and a
nominal interest rate rule for monetary policy.
A. Firms
We start by describing the behavior of firms and its investors in detail. At any
point in time, production and investment take place in a continuum of measure 1
of firms, indexed by j. Some of these firms will default on their debt obligations, in
which case they are restructured before resuming operations again. This means that
firms remain ongoing concerns at all times, so that their measure remains unchanged
through time. Although this is not an essential assumption, it greatly enhances tractability to use an environment where all firms make identical choices.6
Technology.—Each firm produces according to the function
(1)	
y  tj   = At  F(kt  j    , n  tj  )  = At (k)  α n  1−α  ,

where A
 tis aggregate productivity. Solving for the static labor choice we get the
firms’ operating profit:
  At  F(kt  j    , n  tj  ) − wt n  tj  ,
(2)	
Rt kt  j   = max
n  tj  

where Rt  = α yt/ktis the implicit equilibrium rental rate on capital. Given constant
returns to scale, all firms chose identical ratios k  j/n  j , so Rtis identical across firms.
Firm-level profits are also subject to additive idiosyncratic shocks, z  tj   kt  j   , so that
operating profits are equal to
(3)	
(Rt  − z  tj  ) kt  j    .

Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek (2014) and Gomes and Schmid (2016) present models where the c ross section
of firms moves over time with entry and default events.
6
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We assume that z   tj  is i.i.d. across firms and time,
has mean zero, and cumulative
_
_
∫   dΦ(z). We think of
distribution Φ
 (z)over the interval [ _z , z], with ∫ _ zz     ϕ(z)  dz = 
these as direct shocks to firms’ operating income and not necessarily output. They
summarize the overall firm-specific component of their business risk. Although they
average to zero in the cross section, they can potentially be very large for any individual firm.
Firm-level capital accumulation is given by the identity
  = 
 (1 − δ + it  j  )  kt  j    ≡ g(it  j  ) kt  j   ,
(4)	
k tj+1

where it  j  denotes the investment to capital ratio.

Financing.—Firms fund themselves by issuing both equity and defaultable nominal debt. Let B
  tj  denote the stock of outstanding defaultable nominal debt at the
beginning of period t.
To capture the fact that outstanding debt is of finite maturity, we assume that in
every period ta fraction λof the principal is paid back, while the remaining ( 1 − λ)
remains outstanding. This means that the debt has an expected life of 1 / λ. In addition to principal amortization, the firm is also required to pay a periodic coupon c
per unit of outstanding debt.
For convenience, our model assumes only one type of debt which is of equal
seniority. In practice, corporations are constantly issuing multiple forms of debt
instruments which have somewhat different features. What matters for our purpose is
that similar debt instruments are generally issued with identical levels of seniority.7
Letting q   tj  denote the market price of one unit of debt in terms of consumption
goods during period t , it follows that the (real) market value of new debt issues
during period tis given by
  − (1 − λ) B tj  )/Pt  = q  tj    (b tj+1
  − (1 − λ) bt  j  /μt ),
(5)	
q  tj    (B tj+1
where bt  j   = Bt  j  /Pt−1  , Ptis the overall price level in period t , and we define
μt  = Pt/Pt−1as the e conomy-wide rate of inflation between period t − 1and t. We
will work with the real value of these outstanding liabilities throughout the remainder of the paper.
Dividends and Equity Value.—In the absence of new debt issues, (real) distributions to shareholders are equal to
bt  j   j j
j
	
(1 − τ) (Rt  − z  tj  ) kt  j   − ((1 − τ) c + λ)  __
μ    − it     kt     + τδ kt     ,
t

7
For instance, IBM now has over 30 different bonds outstanding that were issued at different times, all with
p ari passu clauses. More broadly, senior unsecured bonds currently account for 68 percent of corporate debt, with
subordinated debt making up only 5 percent. Banks loans and revolving credit facilities account for most of the rest
(S&P Ratings Direct 2014).
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where τis the firm’s effective tax rate. The first term captures the firm’s operating profits, from which we deduct the required debt repayments and investment
expenses and add the tax shields accrued through depreciation expenditures. This
expression for equity distributions is consistent with the fact that interest payments
are tax deductible.
It follows that the value of the firm to its shareholders, denoted J ( · ) , is the present value of these distributions plus the value of any new debt issues. It is useful to
write this value function in two parts, as follows:
(6)  
J( kt  j    , bt  j    , z  tj    , μt ) 

bt  j  
j
j
	  = max[0, (1 − τ) (Rt  − z  tj  ) kt  j   − ((1 − τ)  c + λ)  __
μ    + V(kt      , bt      , μt)]  ,
t

where the continuation value V( · )obeys the following Bellman equation:
(7)

t
j
j
  − 
 (1 − λ)  __
V( kt  j    , bt  j    , μt )  =   max {q  tj  (b tj+1
μt  )  − (i t   − τδ) kt    
j
j
b t+1
 
, k t+1
 


b  j  

_
z

+ Et Mt, t+1 ∫ _z     J(k tj+1
  , b tj+1
  , z  tj+1
  , μt+1)  dΦ(zt+1)},

where the conditional expectation Etis taken only over the distribution of aggregate
shocks. This value function V( · )thus summarizes the effects of the decisions about
future investment and financing on equity values.
Several observations about the value of equity (6) will be useful later. First, limited liability implies that equity value, J( · ) , is bounded and will never fall below
zero. This implies that equity holders will default on their credit obligations when_
z , defined by
ever their idiosyncratic profit shock z  tj  is above a cutoff level z   t∗   ≤ 
the expression
bt  j  
j
j
(8)	
(1 − τ) (Rt  − z  tj∗  ) kt  j   − ((1 − τ)  c + λ)  __
μ    + V(kt      , bt      , μt )  = 0.
t

It is this value z  tj∗+1 that truncates the integral in the continuation value of (7).
Second, the stochastic discount factor Mt, t+1is exogenous to the firm and must be
determined in equilibrium, in a manner consistent with the behavior of households/
investors. Finally, the value function is homogeneous of degree 1 in capital k t  j   and
debt bt  j  and so is the default cutoff z  tj∗  .
Default and Credit Risk.—The firm’s creditors buy corporate debt, at price q  tj    ,
b  j 


t+1
and collect coupon and principal payments, ( c + λ)  ___
μt+1
   , until the firm defaults.

In default, shareholders walk away from the firm, while creditors take over and
restructure the firm. Creditors become the sole owners and investors of the firm and
j
j
 
 
.
are entitled to collect the current after tax operating income ( 1 − τ) (Rt+1  − z  t+1
) k t+1
After this restructuring, creditors resume their customary role by selling off the
equity portion to new owners while continuing to hold the remaining debt. This
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means that in addition to the current cash flows, the creditors have a claim that
j
j
j
j 8
  , b t+1
 
 ( 1 − λ) b t+1
 
.
equals the total enterprise, or asset, value, V( k t+1
) + q  t+1
j
Restructuring entails a separate loss, in the amount ξ  k t+1
 
 , with ξ ∈ 
[0, 1].9
With these assumptions, the creditors’ valuation of their holdings of corporate
debt at the end of period t is10
(9)

 

b tj+1
j
j∗
j
b t+1
  q 
 tj   = Et Mt, t+1{Φ(z  t+1
 ) [c + λ + (1 − λ) q  t+1
 
]  ____
μ   
t+1

_
z


j
j
j
j
+ ∫z  tj∗+1 [
   − z  t+1
 
  + V (k t+1
  , b t+1
  , μt+1) 
) k t+1
 (1 − τ) (Rt+1

  b 
 tj+1
 

q  tj+1
 
]  dΦ(zt+1)}.
ξ k tj+1
+ (1 − λ)  ______
μ   −

t+1

The right-hand side of this expression can be divided into two parts. The first term
reflects the cash flows received if no default takes place, while the integral contains
the payments in default, net of the restructuring charges.
It is immediate to establish that this market value of corporate debt is decreasing
in restructuring losses, ξ , and the default probability, implied by the cutoff z  j∗. It can
also be shown that debt prices are declining in the expected rate of inflation—since
equity values increase in μt +1. Finally, note that q  tj  is homogeneous of degree zero
 
and b tj+1
 
.
in k  tj+1
All together, our assumptions ensure that when the restructuring process is complete, a defaulting firm is indistinguishable from a nondefaulting firm. All losses
take place in the current period and are absorbed by the creditors. Since all idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d. and there are no adjustment costs, default has no further
consequences. As a result, both defaulting and nondefaulting firms adopt the same
optimal policies and look identical at the beginning of the next period.
B. Households
The general equilibrium is completed with the household sector. This is made of
a single representative family which owns all securities and collects all income in
the economy, including a rebate on corporate income tax revenues. Preferences are
time separable over consumption Cand hours worked, N:
∞

(10)	
U = E  ∑  β  t[ log Ct  + θ log(3 − Nt)]   ,
{t=0
}

8
This is only one of several equivalent ways of describing the bankruptcy procedures that yields the same payoffs for shareholders and creditors upon default. Equivalently we could assume that they sell debt and continue to
run the firm as the new equity holders.
9
We can think of these costs as including legal fees, but also other efficiency losses and frictions associated with
the bankruptcy and restructuring processes. These costs represent a collective loss for bond and equity holders, and
may also imply a loss of resources for the economy as a whole.
10
Note that creditors discount the future using the same discount factor as shareholders, Mt, t+1. This is consistent with our assumption that they belong to the same risk-sharing household.
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where β
 ∈ (0, 1)is the rate of intertemporal preference. Assuming log preferences
is not crucial but makes it easier to introduce sticky prices later. In addition, this precise specification allows us to normalize the steady-state number of hours worked
to 1.
As is common in the literature, we find it useful to assume that each member of
the family works or invests independently in equities and debt, and all household
income is then shared when making consumption and savings decisions.
C. Equilibrium and Aggregation
Given the optimal decisions of firms and households implied by the problems
above, we can now characterize the dynamic competitive equilibrium in this
economy.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria where the aggregate state vector is
s = 
(B, K, μ, A) , where Band Kdenote the aggregate levels of debt and capital in
the economy. The nature of the problem means that, outside default, this equilibrium
is symmetric, in the sense that all firms make identical decisions at all times. The
only meaningful cross-sectional difference concerns the realization of the shocks z   tj  
which induce default for a subgroup of firms with mass 1 − Φ(z  ∗). Default implies
a one-time restructuring charge for firms, but these temporary losses have no further
impact on the choices concerning future capital and debt. Thus, all firms remain
ex ante identical in all periods so that we can drop all subscripts jfor firm-specific
variables so that in equilibrium Bt  = btand Kt  = kt.
Aggregate output in the economy, Yt , can be expressed as
(11)	
Yt  = yt   − [1 − Φ(z  ∗) ] ξ  r ξ kt  .

As discussed above, ξ  ktcaptures the loss that creditors suffer in bankruptcy. Some
of these losses may be in the form of legal fees and might be recouped by other
members of the representative family. But some may represent a genuine destruction
of resources. The relative balance between these two alternatives is governed by the
parameter ξ  r ∈ [ 0, 1 ]. In the special case where ξ   r  = 0 , default entails no loss of
resources at the aggregate level.
The aggregate capital stock, Kt  = kt , obeys the law of motion
(12)	
Kt+1  = (1 − δ) Kt  + It ,

where aggregate investment is It  = it kt.
To complete the description of the economy we require that both goods and
labor markets clear. This is accomplished by imposing the aggregate resource
constraint,
(13)	
Yt  = Ct  + It  ,
and the labor market consistency condition,
(14)	
Nt  = nt  .
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II. Characterization

To highlight the economic mechanisms at the heart of the model, this section
characterizes the firms’ leverage choice.
In this section we show that with long-term debt, real leverage responds persistently to i.i.d. inflation shocks. That is, nominal leverage is effectively sticky. A
debt overhang channel then transmits changes in real leverage to changes in real
investment.
Under constant returns to scale, the firm’s problem is linearly homogeneous in
capital and therefore its leverage ratio, defined as ω = b/k , is the single endogenous
state variable. As a result, it seems natural to use this measure of leverage ratio in the
characterization of our findings.11
Conditionally on not defaulting, the value of a firm per unit of capital, v (ω)   = V/k  ,
can be written as
ω
 {q(ω′ g( i) − (1 − λ)  __
(15) v(ω)  =  max
μ )  − i + τδ
ω′ , i

ω′ 
+  g(i)EM′   ∫ _z   [(1 − τ) (R′  − z′ ) − ((1 − τ)  c + λ)  __
   + v(ω′ )]  dΦ(z′ )} 
μ′ 
z   ∗′

where we use primes to denote future values, and the definition g(i) = (1 − δ + i)  k.
For ease of notation, we omit the dependence on the aggregate state variables for the
 and R.
functions v( ω)  , q( ω′ ) , as well as for prices M
The market value of the outstanding debt (9) can be expressed as
q′ (h(ω′ ))ω′ 
ω′   + (1 − λ)  ________
 
(16) ω′ q(ω′ ) = EM′ {Φ(z  ∗′)[c + λ]  __
μ′ 
μ′ 

_
 z

+ (1 − Φ(z  ′)) [(1 − τ) R′  − ξ + v(ω′ )] − (1 − τ) ∫z  ∗′   z′   dΦ(z)}.
∗

Explicitly writing next period’s debt price q(h(ω′ ))as a function of the optimal policy, ω′   = h(ω) , on the right-hand side of equation (16), highlights the potential
time inconsistency problem faced by the firm. With long-lived debt, the price of debt
q(ω′ )depends on future debt prices and thus on next period’s leverage choice ω″ . As
no commitment technology is available, time consistency requires that next period’s
leverage be a function of the current policy choice, so that ω″   = h(ω′ ).
Finally, the optimal default cutoff level, z  ∗ , can be expressed as a function of the
leverage ratio, as
λ __
ω   −  _____
ω _____
1
(17)	
z  ∗  (ω)   = R − c  __
μ ( 1 − τ)    μ   +   ( 1 − τ)  v(ω).

11
This definition of leverage is also the most commonly used in the literature and is consistent with the empirical constructs we use to calibrate the model. An alternative but less convenient definition is the so-called market
leverage ratio, b / V. Regardless of the measure used however, in our model, an inflation shock has no effect on the
long-run leverage ratio, and a short-term transition is produced through a debt overhang effect.
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Differentiating this expression with respect to outstanding leverage ωwe get:
∂ z  ∗( ω)
∂ v(ω)
λ     __
1    +  _____
1    _____
(18)	
 _______
  = − 
c +  ____
   < 0.
μ
(
)
1−τ
∂ω
(1 − τ) ∂ ω

Intuitively, an increase in outstanding debt increases the required principal and coupon payments, and by reducing the cutoff z  ∗(ω) , makes default more likely.12
A. Debt Overhang and the Impact of Inflation
In this subsection, we characterize firm behavior in response to an exogenous
change in the inflation rate, μ
 . To isolate how a shock to μ
 is propagated in the
model, it is assumed in this section that inflation follows an exogenous i.i.d. process.
For the quantitative analysis later in the paper, the inflation rate is persistent and
endogenously driven by real and monetary shocks.
The first-order necessary conditions with respect to investment and leverage are
given by13
(20) 1 − q(ω′ ) ω′  

= EM′   ∫_ z  

ω′    + v(ω′ )    dΦ(z′ ) 
 (1 − τ) (R′  − z′ ) − ((1 − τ)  c + λ)  __
[
]
μ′ 

z  ∗(ω′ )

and
(21)

∂ q(ω′ )
∂ z  ∗(ω′ )
ω   = − (1 − τ)  g(i)  EM′ Φ(z  ∗′)  _______
q( ω′ )  g(i)  +  ______
 (ω′ g( i) − (1 − λ)  __
   .
μ)
∂ ω′ 
∂ ω′ 

The first-order condition for investment, (20), equates the marginal reduction
in equity cash flows today, on the left-hand side, to the expected increase in (after
tax) dividend and capital gains tomorrow, after netting out any debt payments. This
equation captures the debt overhang channel through which the default friction distorts the equilibrium capital allocation.
The optimal condition for leverage, (21), recognizes that the debt price, q(ω′ )  ,
∂ q(ω′ )

   < 0 , thus reducing the marginal benefits of
falls when new debt is issued,  _____
∂ ω′ 
more debt today. The marginal costs of new debt, on the right-hand side, reflects the
∂ z  ∗(ω′ )

.
impact of new debt on the probability of future default, ______
  ∂ ω′  

12

The envelope condition implies that

∂ v(ω)
1 −  
λ
_____
(19)	
 
  = − q  ____
μ ≤ 0.
∂ω

When debt maturity exceeds one period ( λ < 1 ), an increase in outstanding debt decreases the (expected)
future payments to equity holders, further encouraging default.
13
We assume throughout this section that first-order conditions are also sufficient. It is straightforward to derive
conditions on the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock Φ( z)to guarantee that this is true when λ
 = 1.
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The following proposition shows that the effect from unanticipated inflation
depends crucially on the maturity of debt.
Proposition 1: Consider an economy where optimal choices are described by
the optimality conditions (20)–(21), and where: (i) there are no resource costs associated with bankruptcy, i.e., ξ   r  = 0; and (ii) all realizations of exogenous shocks
_
_
, ω
 t  = ω
, and all the
have been zero for a long time so that at time t − 1, μt −1  = μ
other variables are at their steady-state values.
Suppose that at time tthe economy experiences a temporary decline in the infla_
 = 1  , ωt+1
   = ω
t and it  = it−1.
tion rate so that μt  < μt−1. Then, if λ
Proof:
With λ
 = 1 , the current inflation rate, μt  , has no direct effect on the choice of
 t is i.i.d., there is no effect on the expected
ω′   = ωt+1 in (21). Moreover, since μ
default cutoff (17) and the equilibrium price of debt, q(ω′ ). In addition, since
ξ  r  = 0 , there are no resource costs and neither aggregate consumption, C , nor the
stochastic discount factor, M
 ′  , are affected. It follows that there are no indirect general equilibrium effects either, and the optimal choice of leverage, ωt +1is unaffected
by the shock. Finally, μtdoes not appear in (20) and therefore has no direct effect
on the choice of i. ∎
Proposition 1 establishes that i.i.d. movements in inflation will not be propagated
when debt maturity equals 1 period. As is clear from equation (20), current inflation
has no direct impact on the first-order condition for investment. Therefore, without
indirect effects through M′ and R′  , incentives to invest will only change if leverage
changes. That is, inflation shocks are transmitted to real investment, if at all, through
a debt overhang channel.
When λ < 1, debt maturity exceeds one period and a decline in μ
 directly affects
the marginal benefit of issuing new debt. Specifically, the unanticipated decline in
the rate of inflation μincreases the (real) value of currently outstanding liabilities,
(1 − λ)b / μ , and everything else equal, raises the marginal benefit from leverage,
∂ q(ω′ )

   < 0. Intuitively, as (1 − λ)b/μhas increased, an unchanged level of
because  _____
∂ ω′ 
ω
leverage ω′ lowers the amount of debt that is issued, ( ω′ g( i) − (1 − λ)  __
μ ) , and thus
also reduces the impact on debt prices. As a result, equilibrium leverage ω′ will typically increase persistently while ideclines following even i.i.d. inflation shocks.14
Persistent responses of real leverage can also be understood as the reflection of the
∂ q(ω′ )

ω
fact that the marginal debt price effect in equation (21), _____
  ∂ ω′  (ω′ g( i) − (1 − λ)  __
μ )  ,
acts like an (endogenous) convex adjustment cost that slows down the response to
shocks. Because this marginal price effect is an increasing function of the amount
ω
, it discourages the firm from making rapid
of debt issued, ( ω′ g( i) − (1 − λ)  __
μ )
changes to its leverage.15
14
Although we have no formal proof, it is always true that in our simulations unanticipated low inflation
increases ω
 ′ and reduces i.
15
Models with collateral constraints, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) or Jermann and Quadrini (2012),
require a separate friction on equity or debt issuance to produce real effects from shocks to the collateral constraint.
Here, with defaultable long-term debt, no additional friction is needed.
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Figure 1 illustrates this analysis with an example of impulse responses to a onetime decrease in the price level—equivalently an i.i.d. realization of unexpectedly
low inflation. As shown in the third row, the permanent decline in the price level
eventually produces an identical decline in nominal debt, B, and leverage, B/K  ,
so that in the long run there are no real effects to this shock. Initially, however, the
drop in nominal debt only partially offsets the inflation shock—nominal debt and
leverage are effectively sticky. As a result, we can see in the second row that real
leverage, ω , and the default rate, Φ( z  ∗)  , both remain elevated for a prolonged period
of time while investment also declines persistently.
Finally, note that by relaxing the extreme assumptions in Proposition 1, persistent
movements in leverage will occur even when λ = 1. This will happen when either
the underlying inflation movements are persistent or if there are some resource costs
associated with default (ξ  r  ≠ 0).16
III. Quantitative Analysis

We now investigate the quantitative importance of the frictions induced by nominal long-term debt. To better understand these results, we continue to abstract from
the effects of any other nominal rigidities and consider only the model with flexible
prices. A full quantitative characterization also requires two preliminary steps: a
numerical solution strategy and a choice of parameter values. We discuss each of
these issues in detail before reporting our main results.
A. Solution Strategy
The competitive equilibrium is characterized by (11)–(21), plus the first-order
conditions for consumption and labor supply implied by the household’s preferences
(10). Later we also add a monetary policy rule guiding the dynamics of inflation.
The solution of the model is significantly complicated by the presence of the
∂ q(ω′ )

 in (21). To understand the role of this derivative, let us differentiate
derivative _____
  ∂ ω′  
the debt price function (16) to obtain
∂ q(ω′ )
(22) q( ω′ )  +  ω′   ______
  
∂ ω′ 

1
  + (1 − Φ(z  ∗′  )) vω (ω′ ) 
= EM′ {Φ(z  ∗(ω′ ))(c + λ)  __
μ′ 

q(h(ω′ )) 
∂q
ω′    ___
+ (1 − λ)  ______
 (h(ω′ )) · hω(ω′ )
  + (1 − λ)  __
μ′ 
μ′  ∂ ω′ 
∂ z  ∗   ω′  ϕ z  ∗ ω′    −  1 − τ  R′  − z  ∗ ω′    +  c + λ   __
′   + ξ − v(ω′ )  .
+  ___
( ) ( ( ))( (
)(
( )) (
) ω
)}
μ′ 
∂ω
16

In our quantitative analysis, the latter are typically not very strong.
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Figure 1. A Decline in the Price Level
Note: This figure shows the effect of an unanticipated one-time decline in the price level on the key variables of
the model.

∂ q(ω′ )

Hence, the derivative of the debt price,  _____
 ∂ ω′  
 , is linked to the marginal impact
of the current leverage choice, ω
 ′  , on the future choice, ω
 ″  , here captured by the
derivative of the policy function h ω (ω′ ). The presence of this term complicates the
solution by standard local approximation methods because h ω (ω)is unknown and
must be computed together with the policy function itself, h ( ω). Essentially, there is
one additional variable to solve for, namely hω ( ω) , without an additional equation.
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Our strategy is to differentiate both the derivative of the debt price function,
equation (22), and the first-order condition for leverage, (21). The two resulting
equations now include second-order derivatives for the debt price and the policy
∂  2  q(ω′ )

function,  _____
 and hωω(ω). Again we need a boundary condition, but this will now
∂ ω′  2
be imposed on a higher order term. Specifically, we assume that the derivative of the
policy function exhibits constant elasticity in ω
  , but is otherwise unrestricted, so that
	ln hω  = A1(s) + h1  ln ω,

where A1(s)is allowed to be any arbitrary function of the state vector, s. This implies
a restriction that can be used as an additional equation to characterize local dynamics:
hω 
(23)	
hω ω  =  ___
ω  h1  ,
where h1is a constant that can be determined from the deterministic steady state.
This approach does not constrain the fi
 rst-order dynamics of h ω  , and yields a system
of equations that can be fully characterized using first-order perturbation methods.17
Solving for the deterministic steady state is also more involved than for standard
models, because the presence of hω( ω)leaves the system of nonlinear equations
that characterize the deterministic steady state short by one equation. To address
this problem, we instead compute the deterministic steady state using value function iteration over a grid for ω. Computing time is relatively short because the
model is deterministic and there is a univariate grid. Also, this global solution only
needs to produce the steady-state value for ω
  , and not all the derivatives of the
policy function. This is because the nonlinear system of equations for the deterministic steady state is only short one equation. Effectively, knowing the steadystate value for ωprovides us with the missing equation. Our Appendix provides
additional details.
As an alternative, Miao and Wang (2010) solve a model with real long-term debt
by taking the extreme approach of setting hω ( ω′ )  = 0 , thus ignoring any of these
effects. Effectively, in their solution firms act myopically, not realizing that their
current leverage choice influences future leverage and through that the current value
of debt.
The presence of derivatives of unknown functions that characterizes the solution
of our model is also a feature of time-consistent solutions for problems of dynamic
public policy, as studied, for instance, by Klein, Krusell, and RÍos-Rull (2008). In
their model, the government anticipates how future policy will depend on current
policy via the state of the economy. Our solution method shares some of the features
of the approach described in their paper.
Our solution approach allows us to overcome the particular challenges implied by
time-consistent firm behavior with long-term debt without all the limitations of fully
nonlinear global methods. Indeed, once the deterministic steady state for the firms’

17

Assuming instead that hωωequals its constant steady-state value produces slightly different local dynamics.
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Table 1—Calibration
Parameter

Description

Value

Subjective discount factor
Risk aversion
Elasticity of labor
Capital share
Depreciation rate

0.99
1.00
0.63
0.36
0.025

Debt amortization rate
Fraction of resource cost
Default loss
Tax wedge
Distribution parameter

0.05
1.00
0.29
0.40
0.6815

Persistence technology shock
Volatility technology shock
Persistence inflation
Volatility inflation shocks

0.97
0.007
0.85
0.004

Preferences and technology


β
γ
θ
α
δ

Leverage and default


λ
ξ  r
ξ
τ
η1

Shocks

 a
ρ
 a
σ
 μ
ρ
σϵ, μ

problem is found, our approach can take advantage of the scalability of p erturbation
methods to easily handle additional state variables, such as a nominal interest rate
included in a monetary policy rule.
B. Parameter Choices
The model is calibrated at quarterly frequency. While most parameters are chosen to match steady-state targets, some are pinned down by model simulations.
With a few exceptions noted below, the empirical moments are computed over the
1955:I–2012:IV period. All macroeconomic data comes from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (FRED) website. Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameter
choices.
Technology and Preferences.—Our choices for the capital share α
   , depreciation
rate δ , and the subjective discount factor β
 all correspond to fairly common values
in the literature. Together they determine the c apital-output and investment-output
ratios, as well as the average rate of return on capital in our economy. As long as
they remain in a plausible range, the quantitative properties of the model are not
very sensitive to these parameter values.
Productivity Shocks.—We assume the following general AR(1) representation for
the stationary component of aggregate productivity:
   + σa ε  at    .
	ln At  = ρa  ln At−1
We construct series for Solow residuals using data on GDP, hours, capital stock and
the GDP deflator. This yields estimates of ρa  = 0.97and σa   = 0.007.
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To summarize the behavior of idiosyncratic profit shocks, we adopt a general
quadratic approximation to its probability density function (PDF):
(24)	
ϕ(z) = η1  + η2  z + η3 z  2  .
Our earlier assumptions_ about the distribution’s mean imply that η2  = 0. Imposing
symmetry on ϕ(z) with z  = − _z   = 1 ensures that there is only one free parameter, η1.
Its value is selected to target the unconditional volatility of the leverage ratio, a key
variable in our model. While η1is closely linked to the volatility of leverage, for the
range of values for η1 for which the model can be solved, the model cannot produce
enough volatility in leverage to fully match the empirical calibration target.
Together with the average leverage ratio, ω , and expected debt life, 1/λ , the value
for η1 is a crucial determinant of the impact and persistence of shocks on firm leverage and investment. This is because the choice of η1governs the mass of firms
accumulated around the default threshold of ϕ
 (z  ∗). If this mass is sizable, shocks
can have large impacts on the default probability, Φ(z  ∗) , and on bond prices, q (ω).
Leverage Parameters.—The parameter λ
 determines average debt maturity. This
is an important parameter for determining the propagation of shocks. We choose a
value of λ = 0.05per quarter, implying an average expected maturity of five years,
similar to initial maturities of industrial and commercial loans, and significantly
shorter than those for corporate bonds. Given the importance of this parameter, we
prefer to focus on the results when debt maturity is conservatively calibrated. We
also document how results change when average debt maturities change. The periodic coupon rate, cis much less important. We set it to c = exp(μ)/β − 1 , so that
the price of default free debt is equal to 1.
Given cand λ
  , the expressions for bond prices (16) and optimal investment (20)
link the default loss parameter, ξ , and the tax wedge, τ , with the steady-state levels
of the default rate Φ
 (z  ∗)and the leverage ratio, ω. Default rates are chosen to closely
match Moody’s average default rate of 0.26 percent per quarter (Moody’s Investor
Service 2014). The leverage ratio is constructed using data from the FRB (2013)
and defined as the ratio of credit market instruments to real assets (at current cost)
plus cash and cash equivalent holdings for the US nonfinancial business sector. This
equals 42percent for both entire sample and the subperiod since 1971. Recent values however are much higher, with corporate debt ratios averaging almost 52 percent between 2005 and 2009.
With this data we estimate values of ξ = 0.29and τ = 0.4. The chosen default
cost parameters imply average s teady-state recovery rates at default of about 30 percent. Higher default costs imply that firms are less likely to default in equilibrium so
that overall expected default costs remain unchanged. Finally we assume all restructuring charges involve a deadweight resource loss so that ξ   r  = 1.18

18
The (statutory) wedge implied by corporate income rates and the tax treatment of individual interest and
equity income during this period is about 2 5percent. As a result, we should think of τ as capturing other relative
benefits of using debt rather than equity (e.g., issuance costs).
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Table 2—Aggregate Moments

First moments
Investment/output, I / Y
Leverage
Default rate, 1 − Φ(z  ∗)
Second moments
σY
σI /σY
σC /σY 
σN /σY 
σω 
σμ 

Model

Data

0.24
0.42
0.0022

0.20
0.42
0.0026

1.44
3.46
0.37
0.38
0.67
0.5

1.65
4.23
0.52
1.07
1.7
0.5

Standard error
0.0071
0.0081
0.0015  a
0.0013
0.1824
0.0277
0.1422
0.0015
0.0005

Notes: The reported first moments are computed as averages in the data, and steady-state values
in the model. Second moments are standard deviations based on HP1600-filtered data and model
series. Standard errors are Newey-West corrected.
a
Standard error of the annual default rate

Inflation Dynamics.—In the basic model with flexible prices the dynamics of
inflation are exogenous and determined by the monetary authority. Hence, in this
section we will directly model the dynamics of inflation by assuming it follows an
AR(1) process that matches both the quarterly volatility and persistence of this variable. For the period between 1955:I–2012:IV these are estimated to be 0.004and
0.85  , respectively.
Summary.—Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices for the benchmark calibration. The model is quite parsimonious and requires only 10 structural parameters,
in addition to the stochastic process for the shocks. Table 2 shows the implications
of these choices for the first and second (unconditional) moments of a number of
key variables.
The second panel in Table 2 shows that our quantitative model shares many of the
properties of other variations of the stochastic growth model. All the main aggregates have plausible volatilities, except for labor, as is typical in the standard stochastic growth model. The empirical standard deviation for default rates is available
only at an annual frequency, and is equal to 1.4 percent (Moody’s Investor Service
2014). The model counterpart is quite close at 1.6 percent.
C. Findings
We now investigate the quantitative importance of the frictions induced by nominal long-term debt. We are interested in determining how the model responds to
movements in the inflation rate and how much endogenous propagation can plausibly be generated by the combination of our sticky leverage and debt overhang
mechanisms.
Response to Inflation Changes.—Proposition 1 shows that under very general
conditions, even pure i.i.d. movements in inflation can induce prolonged movements
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Figure 2. An Inflation Shock
Note: This figure shows the effect of an unanticipated one-standard-deviation decline in the inflation rate, μt, on the
key variables of the model.

in corporate leverage and investment. Figure 2 shows how more realistic changes in
the inflation rate are reflected in the general equilibrium response of the key macroeconomic aggregates.
Following a one-standard-deviation negative shock to inflation, the default rate
increases as the real value of outstanding corporate liabilities increases. This increase
in the default rate immediately produces output losses since restructuring costs are
not rebated to households and represent real deadweight losses. For a 0.4percent
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innovation in inflation, investment and output decline at impact by 2 .5percent and
0.5percent, respectively.
Inflation shocks have particularly strong and persistent effects on investment.
Strong impact effects on investment are not particularly surprising since other models of financial frictions often produce large distortions in the investment Euler
equation (for instance, Jermann and Quadrini 2012). Because our household/
investors have log preferences, risk premia are very small and the source of the
financial friction is tied to the expected loss upon default—which depends on the
default loss parameter, ξ.
The more striking result, a priori, is the large persistence in the investment
response, which mirrors that in default rates and leverage, and is driven by the sticky
leverage and debt overhang effects discussed above. As Proposition 1 implies, leverage—here we report its market value, qω′ —rises and remains elevated for a long
time even though inflation quickly returns to its long-run mean, leading to a prolonged, and significant, contraction in investment spending.
Figure 2 captures one weakness in this flexible price model. Initially, at least,
changes in inflation mainly induce intratemporal reallocation between consumption
and investment expenditures. While the increase in the required rental rate on capital
works to stifle investment, it leads to a short-term boom in consumption. Eventually,
the lower capital stock leads to lower output, and consumption begins to decline.
Labor initially mirrors the behavior of consumption, as households seek to smooth
their leisure decisions as well, but, over time, reduced capital contributes to lowering
the marginal product of labor. To address this issue we will consider a version of the
model with sticky prices in the next section.19
Finally, it is worth restating that, with flexible prices, the exact source of inflation
is irrelevant. The responses of the key variables will be similar regardless of whether
the inflation movements are exogenous or induced by some monetary policy rule.
All that matters for these dynamics is the actual behavior of the inflation rate.
Variance Decomposition.—Table 3 shows the contribution of inflation shocks to
the total variance of key macro and financial aggregates in the flexible price model
as well as the sensitivity of this measure with respect to some key assumptions.20
Regardless of our calibration, inflation shocks are always the dominant source of
variations in leverage and default rates. In addition, in our benchmark model inflation is also responsible for 44 percent of the variance of investment and 23 percent
of the variance of output. Clearly, even in this flexible price model, inflation nonneutralities can be quantitatively important.
In the baseline case, leverage matches the data for the period since 1955. When
our economy is calibrated to an average leverage ratio of only 32 percent, inflation
still accounts for about one-quarter of the movements in investment. If, instead, the
leverage ratio matches the value observed in the period between 2005–2009, which

19
Another possible alternative is to instead use GHH preferences (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman 1988).
In this case consumption and labor do not move on impact and will decline afterward.
20
Since movements in total factor productivity (TFP) are the only other source of fluctuations here, the fraction
of the variance coming from TFP shocks is 1 minus the number reported in the table.

VOL. 106 NO. 12

3819

Gomes et al.: Sticky Leverage

Table 3—Variance Decomposition (Due to Inflation)

Benchmark

Shorter maturity, λ
 = 0.06
One-period debt, λ
 = 1.00
High leverage (0.52)
Low leverage (0.32)

Output

Investment

Consumption

Hours

Leverage

Default

0.23
0.22
0.00
0.43
0.10

0.44
0.42
0.00
0.70
0.22

0.16
0.14
0.00
0.58
0.04

0.12
0.10
0.00
0.46
0.03

0.88
0.86
0.98
0.93
0.64

0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.99

is 52 percent, inflation shocks account for two-thirds of the investment variance and
nearly one-half of the variance of output.
Table 3 also shows that with one-period debt, real quantities are almost unaffected
by movements in the inflation rate, and we essentially recover monetarily neutrality.
There are two reasons for this. First, for a given inflation process, percentage gains
and losses on bonds produced by inflation are quite small with short maturities.
Second, the debt overhang channel is entirely absent with one-period debt.
IV. Model with Nominal Rigidities

The flexible price model is very useful to illustrate the key role of stickiness of
nominal liabilities and the persistent effect of inflation movements on economic
aggregates induced by the overhang of long-term debt. However, the model fails to
match the volatility of aggregate hours. More significantly, as shown in Figure 2,
the model suffers from a basic comovement problem in that debt overhang leads at
impact to an intratemporal reallocation of resources toward consumption.
In addition, the flexible price model isolates the determination of inflation, thus
failing to allow for the joint endogeneity of aggregate prices and quantities. To
address these concerns we now consider an expanded version of the model that
allows for nominal price rigidities. Adding this standard form of money n onneutrality
both improves the model’s ability to fit the data and allows us to better appreciate
the relative importance of long-term nominal debt to macroeconomic fluctuations.
To accomplish this, we modify the model by introducing a new economic agent:
monopolistically competitive retailers. While our firms remain perfectly competitive they now produce (intermediate) goods that are sold to retailers, before being
finally passed to the final consumers. We now also explicitly model the behavior of
the monetary authority.
A. Retailers
There is a continuum of retailers, indexed by r ∈ [ 0, 1 ]. Retailers buy goods
from the intermediate producers at real (or deflated) price/cost P
m
 t , package them,
and sell them to households at nominal price Prt. Each retailer acts as a monopolist.
The final good, used for consumption and investment, is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregator of the retailers’ output, denoted Yrt:
ϵ/(ϵ−1)

(25)	
Yt  = [∫
 0   (Yrt )  (ϵ−1)/ϵ] 
1

 ,
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where ϵ is linked to the elasticity of substitution across the different varieties of
goods sold by retailers. It follows that each retailer faces the demand curve:
−ϵ

P 
  rt ]    .
(26)	
Yrt  = Yt [___
Pt
Following Calvo (1983) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we
assume each retailer can change their price optimally in period t with probability
1 − ψ. A retailer then chooses P
  t⋆  optimally to solve
∞

P t⋆  
i
___
(27)	
max
  E
   
∑
   ψ 

 
M


 
  − Pm, t+i  Yr, t+i  .
t
t, t+i[
]
Pt+i
Pt  ⋆  
i=0
Note that this implies that the optimal price, Pt  ⋆   , will be identical across the retailers
setting prices at time t.
The optimal price-setting behavior implies the following law of motion for the
aggregate price level (Calvo 1983):
(28)	
Pt  = [∫0   P f1−ϵ
t  ] 
1

1/(1−ϵ)

  = [(1 − ψ) (P
  t⋆  )  1−ϵ  + ψ [Pt−1]  1−ϵ] 

1/(1−ϵ)

.

This formulation requires us to specify only two new parameter values, the elasticity of substitution, ϵ , and the probability of price fixing, ψ.
B. Monetary Authority
In accordance with the literature we assume the monetary authority uses the
Taylor rule,
(29)	ln rt  = v0  + ρr  ln rt−1  + (1 − ρr)[ vμ   ln μt  + vy  ln(Yt  /Yt−1)]  + ζt  , 

where r tis the nominal (gross) one-period interest rate, which obeys the Euler equation,

1
(30)	
rt  =  ___________
  
   , 
Et Mt, t+1/μt+1
 
and ζ t is an exogenous monetary policy shock.
C. Quantitative Analysis
To study the properties of this sticky price model, we need to specify the values for a number of additional parameters. Regarding the monetary policy rule, the
responses to inflation and output growth are set to v y  = 0.2and v μ   = 1.5while the
smoothing parameter is estimated to be ρ
 r   = 0.5. These values are consistent with
21
estimates from the literature. The volatility and persistence of the monetary policy
21

See Clarida, GalÍ, and Gertler (2000).
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Table 4—Aggregate Moments
Flexible prices

Sticky prices

Data

Standard error

First moments
Investment/output, I / Y
Leverage, ω

Default rate, 1 − Φ(z  ∗)

0.24
0.42
0.0022

0.20
0.42
0.0026

0.20
0.42
0.0026

0.0071
0.0081
0.0015  a

Second moments
σY
σI /σY 
σC /σY 
σN /σY 
σω 
σμ 

1.44
3.46
0.37
0.38
0.67
0.5

1.45
4.98
0.41
1.05
0.69
0.5

1.65
4.23
0.52
1.07
1.7
0.5

0.0013
0.1824
0.0277
0.1244
0.0015
0.0005

Notes: The reported first moments are computed as averages in the data, and steady-state values in the model.
Second moments are standard deviations based on HP1600-filtered data and model series. Standard errors are
Newey-West corrected.
a
Standard error of the annual default rate.

shock, ζt , are set so that the model matches the quarterly volatility and persistence
of the inflation rate.
The elasticity of substitution between goods sold by retailers, ϵ , is set to 5  ,
close to the value in Gertler and Karadi (2011), and the estimates in Primiceri,
Schaumburg, and Tambalotti (2006). Regarding price stickiness, we follow
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and assume ψ = 0.6so that retailers
reoptimize prizes once every 2.5 quarters, on average.22
Table 4 compares the predictions of the flexible and sticky price versions of the
model to the unconditional moments of key macro variables. Notably, the version of
the model with sticky prices produces much higher volatility in work hours, matching their volatility relative to output over the business cycle.23
Figures 3 and 4 document the response of the key variables in the model to monetary and total factor productivity shocks. In both figures the dotted lines show the
baseline responses in the model with long-term debt, while the dashed lines depict
the case where debt maturity is just one period.
It is apparent that the responses are always larger in the model with long-term
debt. The differences are particularly significant for monetary policy shocks.
Figure 3 shows that even though inflation dynamics are very similar, the model with
long-term debt produces a much larger drop in investment, hours worked, and output.
As before, these general equilibrium responses are largely due to the long-lasting
movements in corporate leverage and the effects of debt overhang on investment.
The figure also shows that the sticky price model does not suffer from a
comovement problem: now both consumption and investment drop following a monetary tightening. This is because sticky prices lead to a much larger immediate drop
in output in response to this shock.
It is well known that the effects of technology shocks can be amplified by adding
financing frictions to corporate investment. Figure 4 shows that these effects can be
Our choice is also close to the micro evidence from Bils and Klenow (2004).
We also recalibrate the distribution parameter for the idiosyncratic shocks, η1  , to 0.695. This preserves the
volatility of leverage across model versions.
22
23
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Figure 3. A Monetary Shock
Note: This figure shows the effect of an exogenous shock to the monetary policy rule on the key variables of the
model, with long-term debt, λ = 0.05 (dotted line) and short-term debt, λ = 1 (dashed line).

further amplified (and propagated) when these frictions take the form of long-term
nominal debt. While the differences between the long-term and short-term debt
cases are smaller than for the monetary shocks, the responses of the main macro
quantities exhibit more persistence when debt maturity is longer.
Notably, with long-term debt, the model can generate a realistic drop in hours
worked. This is not the case when debt matures after one period. To obtain an initial
drop in hours worked in this case we would need to allow for a larger (and less plausible) degree of price rigidity, ψ.
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Figure 4. A Negative Productivity Shock
Note: This figure shows the effect of a negative productivity shock on the key variables of the model, with l ong-term
debt, λ
 = 0.05 (dotted line) and short-term debt, λ = 1 (dashed line).

Variance Decomposition.—Table 5 reexamines the contribution of monetary
shocks to the total variance of key macro and financial aggregates with sticky prices.
The model with sticky prices exhibits even stronger monetary nonneutralities. Now
even when debt lasts for only one period (λ = 1), nominal shocks account for about
34 percent of the total variance of GDP and nearly 47 percent of that in investment.
Interestingly, the table also shows that the effects of the nominal frictions are
almost additive. The contribution of nominal shocks to the variance of GDP in the

3824

DECEMBER 2016

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW

Table 5—Variance Decompositions (Due to Inflation)
Output

Investment

Consumption

Hours

Leverage

Default

Panel A. Flexible price model
Benchmark
Shorter maturity, λ
 = 0.06
One-period debt, λ
 = 1.00
High leverage (0.52)
Low leverage (0.32)

0.23
0.22
0.00
0.43
0.10

0.44
0.42
0.00
0.70
0.22

0.16
0.14
0.00
0.58
0.04

0.12
0.10
0.00
0.46
0.03

0.88
0.86
0.98
0.93
0.64

0.99
0.99
0.99
0.98
0.99

Panel B. Sticky price model
Benchmark
Shorter maturity, λ
 = 0.06
One-period debt, λ
 = 1.00
High leverage (0.52)
Low leverage (0.32)

0.38
0.37
0.24
0.44
0.35

0.73
0.72
0.47
0.82
0.66

0.06
0.06
0.02
0.13
0.05

0.90
0.90
0.87
0.92
0.89

0.92
0.90
0.94
0.94
0.90

0.99
0.98
1.00
0.99
0.98

sticky price model with long-term debt (38 percent) is essentially equal to the sum
of the contributions of sticky prices (24percent, for λ = 1) plus that of sticky
long-term debt (23percent, in the flexible price model).
For investment and consumption, the two nominal frictions have typically also
about the same impact. Sticky prices are more important for the variation of hours,
but corporate leverage and default are driven almost exclusively by debt.
A Collapse in Wealth.—As a final experiment, we examine the case of a large
decline in the value of the stock of capital in the economy. This experiment can be
viewed as capturing some aspects of the contraction seen since 2007–2008, with
sharply declining real estate values. Formally, this is implemented by an unexpected
decrease in the value of the capital stock kof 5 percent, through a one-time increase
in the depreciation rate, δ. Our implementation is similar to that in Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and Gourio (2013). Unlike these authors, however, our model does
not require a persistent shock to generate a prolonged decline in investment after the
initial period.
Figure 5 examines the effects of this shock in the neoclassical (flexible price)
model with l ong-term debt, where inflation does not move at all, and in the full New
Keynesian model where the monetary authority induces an endogenous response of
inflation. On impact, the destruction of the capital stock lowers both firm and equity
values. This leads to an immediate spike in corporate defaults, and an increase in
leverage ratios. Without a monetary response inflation remains constant (dashed
lines), and the debt overhang leads to long-lasting real declines in investment, consumption, and output. It is particularly striking that despite the large destruction of
capital, investment is below average for several periods after the shock.
In the New Keynesian model (dotted lines) however, monetary policy responds
with a sustained increase in inflation which reduces the burden of outstanding liabilities and default rates. This in turn mitigates the magnitude of the decline in the
macroeconomic aggregates and the economy recovers a lot faster. With a 5percent
reduction in the capital stock, the model’s implied inflation rises about 1percent
above its steady-state level over the first year after the shock.
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Figure 5. A Wealth Shock
Notes: This figure shows the effect of a o ne-time exogenous destruction of the capital stock, k , by 5 percent through
an increase of the depreciation rate, δ. It compares the model’s responses in the neoclassical model when inflation
is unchanged (dashed line) and in the new Keynesian model when it adjusts endogenously according to the monetary policy rule (dotted line).

Although only suggestive, this experiment is quite consistent with a policy prescription in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and summarized by Rogoff (Miller
2009):
I’m advocating 6 percent inflation for at least a couple of years. It would
ameliorate the debt bomb and help us work through the deleveraging
process.
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V. Conclusion

In this paper we have presented a general equilibrium model with nominal
l ong-term debt that can help us better understand the monetary nonneutralities associated with Irving Fisher’s (1933) debt deflation. The model also sheds some light
on the slowdown following the 2008 financial crisis and possible monetary policy
responses. Our model is capable of generating very large and persistent movements
in output and investment, even without price rigidities. Adding standard price rigidities helps the model producing more volatile labor and more realistic c omovements
between investment and consumption.
Almost unavoidably, our attempt to write a parsimonious and tractable model
leaves out many important features. In particular, we ignore nominal debt contracts
other than those held by firms, even though household debt is roughly equal in magnitude and subject to similarly large restructuring costs.
Our analysis also abstracts from the role of movements in credit risk premia and the
behavior of asset prices in general. In addition, while convenient, the assumption of
constant returns to scale, which nearly eliminates firm heterogeneity and renders the
model so tractable, also limits our ability to study firm behavior more comprehensively.
We leave the explorations of these and other simplifying assumptions for future
work. Nevertheless we believe none is essential to the main ideas in the paper.
Appendix: Solution Method
The dynamics of the model are characterized using a first-order perturbation
approximation around the deterministic steady state.
To compute the deterministic steady state, R
 is initially taken as given. Three
equations, (15), (16), and (17), are used to solve for the steady-state level of leverage by value function iteration. The fi
 rst-order condition for investment is then used
to find an updated value for R
  , and this is repeated until convergence.
The full model’s steady state is then obtained by combining the steady-state value
for leverage with the equilibrium conditions (11)–(21), the first-order conditions for
consumption and labor supply implied by the household’s preferences (10), (22),
and the derivatives of (22) and (21) with respect to ω
 .
To study the model’s dynamics, this system of equations is augmented with one
equation determining the behavior of the second derivative of the policy function,
hωω  = (hω   / ω) h1 , which is based on the assumption that the first derivative of the
policy function exhibits constant elasticity in ω
 . The coefficient h 1is set equal to
hωω( ω / hω ) evaluated at the deterministic steady state.
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